RG: How would you characterize Myanmar’s peace process? How has it triumphed/faltered under Suu Kyi?

你怎样描述缅甸和平进程？在昂山素季政府任内它有怎样的发展（顺利还是困境）？

刘蕴：Myanmar’peace process has regrettably faltered, if not on a path to failure, under Suu Kyi’s watch. It should not be blamed on her leadership per se, but on the lacking of trust among all stake holders.

很遗憾，在素季的管理下，缅甸和平进程如果没有走向失败，至少也陷入困境。但是这并不能归咎于素季的领导能力本身，而是由于各方互不信任。

RG: What is China’s role in the peace process?

中国在和平进程中扮演怎样角色？

刘蕴：Right now China is using muscle to persuade the FPNCC to take part in the peace process designed by the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, against which the FPNCC has leveled bitter criticism with a profound distrust.

目前，中国正动用影响力劝说FPNCC参与缅甸和平进程。该进程的基本路线已经由《全国停火协议》设计好了，但是FPNCC不信任《全国停火协议》并猛烈批评这份协议。

RG: What are China’s interests in Myanmar? How do OBOR projects inform its position toward Myanmar?

中国对缅甸的关注点在哪里？一带一路项目怎样在缅甸实施？

刘蕴：China’s interests in Myanmar are multileveled, i.e. through government to government, party to party and people to people, etc. The BRI projects, especially the newly proposed China Myanmar Economic Corridor（CMEC）,needs to be hammered into shape stage by stage.

中国对缅甸的关注是多层级的，比如政府间关系、党际关系以及人文交流等等。一带一路项目，特别是新近提出的“中缅经济走廊”需要分步骤实施。

RG: How does investment in different areas inform its peace process strategy?

不同区域的投资项目如何应对缅甸和平进程？

刘蕴：Actually the peace process is in a mess. For investors it is preferred to wait and see what the peace process will bring.

事实上和平进程是一团乱麻。投资者最好静观时变。

RG: How has China’s position shifted since the last conference? How have China’s tactics been affected by a) Myanmar’s deteriorating relationship with West and b) faltering peace process/renewed conflict in Kachin?

上次彬龙大会以来，中国的立场是否有改变？针对缅甸与西方关系恶化以及克钦邦冲突升级，中国的策略如何调整？

刘蕴：I guess China’s position and tactics have not shifted since the last Panglong conference, that is, to promote peace through talks and to maintain security and stability for China-Myanmar border.

我认为中国的立场和策略一直没变——劝和促谈以及维护边境安全稳定。

RG: How would you describe China government’s relations with FPNCC and its groups?

你怎样描述中国政府与FPNCC的关系？

刘蕴：China government has taken a pragmatic way of dealing with the FPNCC. For example, a deputy director-general from Yunnan provincial government has been assigned to accompany the FPNCC delegation to the Panglong conference.

处理FPNCC问题上，中国政府采取非常务实的手段。比如这次委派云南省一位副厅长陪同FPNCC参加彬龙大会。

RG: Does China “campaign" for groups on its border in the government peace process? How and why?

在缅甸和平进程上中国是否为中缅边境民地武游说造势？如果有的话，是什么原因，怎样进行的？

刘蕴：China has “campaigned” for both the Myanmar government and the FPNCC. It could be described as a special “shuttle diplomacy”.

中国在缅甸政府和FPNCC两边都进行“游说”，这就像特殊的“穿梭外交”。

RG: Does it negotiate over issues such as vetoes in UN etc?

中国在联合国动用否决权，是否与缅甸有商谈？

刘蕴：I have no idea. 我不了解。

RG: Does China want control/ownership over peace process? And why? Do you know of any evidence to suggest  it has blocked other actors?

中国是否想控制和平进程？为什么要控制？你有证实中国阻止其它方面参与和平进程的资料吗？

刘蕴：I do not believe China want dominance over peace process. But I do believe that China will only become more resolute in controlling the borderland and excluding other actors.

我不相信中国想去控制和平进程。但是我相信中国控制中缅边境形势的决心越来越大，这个决心是排他的。